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Abstract

MallyfirlJ7s in the pharmacelltical indllstlY tum to acquisitiolls when faced
with gaps in their dmg development pipelines and patent expirations as an
alternative to making long-term investments in internal research and development.
Illvestors are generally negative on this strategy, and upon the announcement qf a
pharmaceutical acquisition the stock

~fthe

acquiringjirm (ifiell drops. this decline

ill share price creates an opportunityfor the investor who can ident{fy the
characteristics (~f a target firm that increase the prohahility that the trallsaction will
ultimately he a success, as measured by the suhseqllent appreciation in the acquirer 's
stock. It is expected that the characteristics oj a succes.~fi" acquisition are related to
the targetfirm 's pipeline. Spec{fically, higher quantities

~f late-stage

dmgs in the

target 's pipeline as well as ajoclls on developing biotechllology dmgs are expected
to lead to superior returnsjor the acquiringjirm 's investors.

Introduction

Meeting the goal of maximizing shareholder returns in the pharmaceutical
indu try i predicated on the firm 's ability to su tain a pipeline of new and innovat ive
products.

]n

attempting to strengthen their product pipelines, pharmaceutical firms

can essentially pursue two di tinct trategies. The first potential course of action
involves making long-term investments in internal research and development . The
second strategy is to strengthen the pipeline by engaging in mergers and acqui itions
in order to acquire another firm's pipeline of drugs. While the focus of this paper is
the merger and acquisition strategy, it is helpful to begin with a di cus ion and
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analysi of so me of the major problem associated w ith the process of ma in taining a
strong pipeline throug h internal drug development.

The Challenges of Internal Growth
In ve ting in internal research and development presents ma ny cha ll enge with
no guarantee of developing a successful new drug . The process of bring ing a new
drug to the market is a long and expen ive one, and the ri k offailure is present at
every tage of this process. The heavy financial commitment that research and
developm ent demands al

0

prevents resources from being de voted to other means of

g rowing the company and increasing hareholder value that could have more of an
immediate impact, such a additional expenditures on adverti ing the compa ny'
drug currently on the market or increasing the dividends paid out to shareholders.
Despite the e drawbacks, pharmaceutical companies are constantly striving to
develop the next blockbuster drug through orga nic re earch and de velopm e nt .

Regulatory Process
When a pharmaceutical company decides to make a major in vest ment in
hope of developing a new drug, there is always a great risk that the drug may fail to
gain the approval of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and thu potentially
become nothing more than a major sunk cost. The FDA is an agency that is pari of
the United States Department of Health and Human Services, and it i charged with
protecting the health of the American public. One of the major responsibilities this
entails is determining if and when a new drug is afe to be marketed and old to the
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public. The FDA has received some scathing critici m for over-regulating from
economists suc h a the great Milton Friedman, who said that " The FDA has done
enormou harm to the health of the American public by great ly increa ing the co ts of
pharmaceutical research, thereby reducing the supply of new and effective drugs, and
by delaying the approval of such drugs as survive the tortuou FDA proce " (K lein
2000) . De pite critici ms uch as these, the FDA does play an important role in
bringing a new drug to market and they will continue to inten ely scrutinize any drug
before it reaches the public. This inevitably result in a long and costly proce .
There are even stages involved in bringing a new drug to market (Kellog
and Charnes 2000) . The fir t stage is discovery, where researchers identify promising
new molecular entities (NMEs) . If the compound ha promise it then enters the
regulatory process. The process of gaining FDA approval starts with pre-clinical .
trial . In tage two of the process the compound is closely scrutinized and tested in
vilro, which literally tran lates to " in the glas ."

At this tage additional te tare

done, generally in te t tubes or petri dishes . If this part of the pre-clinical trial goes
well , they enter stage three where animal testing will begin to determine if the drug i
safe to proceed to the clinical trial stage (stage four) . Less than 1% of the compounds
that enter the pre-clinical trials make it to the human testing that take place in the
clinical stage (Grabowski 2002) .
For those drugs that do manage to survive these pre-clinical trials, there is an
even more intense process ahead in the stage three clinical trials . There are three
phases in the clinical trial process. Phase 1 of the clinical trials entails giving a mall
dose of the compound being tested to a very small sample size of humans . Generally,
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the sample ize in Phase 1 consists of healthy adult , and the purpose i to determine
the appropriate do e that should be g iven as the effect the drug ha o n the body. If
the Pha e I tests do not rai e any red flags, the compound proceed to Pha e II.
Phase IT i where the majority of failures occur, as it is the first time that the full dose
is g iven to humans, and the sample size is again increased . The amp le in thi phase
usuall y con i ts of adults who have the condition the drug is intend ed to treat. For
tho e compou nd that do survive Phase II , Phase llL is the most expensive tage, a
re ult of the length and intensity of the trials in the phase. The sample size is
enlarged in an attempt to increase the chances that the benefits will be determi ned to
be tatistically significant. If all goes well in Phase Lll, the company submit s a

ew

Drug Application ( DA) to the FDA, who will inform the developing company if
they may begin to market the drug to the public. This clinical trial proces is both
expen ive and time consuming, and only 22% of the compounds that enter thi
proce s ultimately ucceed in gaining the FDA ' s approval (Grabowski 2002) . Once
the drug can finally be marketed , the company enters the final po st-appro val stage,
where they continue to monitor and research the newl y approved drug .
This demonstrates that researching and developing a new drug and
succe sfull y bringing it to market is extremely difficult, and in this proces the take
are high . Thi is because developing a new drug is an extremely costly endeavor.
Joseph DiMasi, Ronald Hansen and Henry Grabowski (2003) found that the average
out-of-pocket cost of developing a new drug is $403 million (DiMa i et al. 2003).
This fi gure is before expenditure for marketing and other co ts associated with
finally bringing a new drug to the market, assuming it is one of the fortunate few that
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ever make it that far . For those select drug that are eventually marketed and
distributed to the public, the total cost is, on average, in exce

of$800 million .

For those new drugs that do succeed in gaining the FDA' s approval and make
it to market, there i a limited window in which these drugs can really produce strong
revenues for the developing firm . This is because on average the e new drug only
enjoy an eight year effective patent life in which to recoup the costs of development
and make the firm profitable. A drug ' s effective patent law life is the time that drug
is under patent protection after reaching the market. Although patents for new
pharmaceuticals generally last for twenty years, the time that it take to te t and
develop those drugs counts against the patent's life . Since it takes on average twelve
years to bring a drug to market, that drug is only on the market and enjoying patent
protection for eight years before generic competition is allowed to enter the market.
This generic competition forces the developing firm to drastically reduce their prices,
since once other firms can just copy the compound it is extremely cheap to
manufacture the drugs.

DecisionfoJ" Inlernal Developmenl
As the FDA approval process suggests, the decision facing a pharmaceutical
firm present a complex capital budgeting problem . Kellogg and Charnes (2000)
developed a model that can help value drug development projects. They calculated
that the expected net present value (ENPV) of a drug is

(I)
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The

PY estimation has two di tinct cash fl ows : the first is w here the

pharmaceutical is making cash outlays during the deve lop ment tage ( OC F) of the
drug and the seco nd is where the pharmaceutical is receiving cash inflows from
commercial ucces (CCF) . At each stage, where i is an index of the seve n stages of
drug develop me nt, there is the conditional probability Pi that the drug wi ll succeed at
the end tage for a drug that i in stage i-I . qj is the probability of uccess once the
drug makes it to market. Kellogg and Charne di vi ded the degrees of uccess into
five categorie ranging from "dog" to " breakthroug h." T is when all future cash
flow fa ll s to zero. In the OCF this happen s when the drug reaches the next stage,
while in the CCF this occurs at the expiration of the patent. Each peri od has its own
di count rate. rd is the di count rate for development cash flow s while rc is the
di scount rate for commercialized cash flows . Kellogg and C harnes u ed six a nd nine
percent for the discount rate for the development and commercialized stages,
respectively. As Kellogg and Charnes discuss, this model can be u ed to value each
of the projects in a potential target' s pipeline, which can then lead to a va lu ation of
the firm as a w hole.
For the purposes of this paper, it will be helpful to modify the equation
presented by Kellogg and Charnes. This modification will allow u to analyze a
project in a firm's pipeline during the patent stage and during the post-patent stage
separatel y. This will take into account that just because a drug loses its patent
protection, the revenues a firm derives from that drug do not fall to zero. Prices often
are dramati cally slashed, but the firm will often to continue to produce that drug and

6

ell it under the same name, albeit at a g reat discount. The econd term of equation I
above i modified and presented below.

ENPV

=

~s

. (~T

P7 L.t = l q}

CCFP )

L.. t= l (1+r)t

+

(LN

CCFe )

g = T+l (1+ r)9

(2)

Where CCF p is the ca h flow during the patent life and CCFc; is the cash flow during
the generi c period .
As a drug in the pipeline completes a stage of development, it become more
valu ab le, as the probability of it ultimately reachin g the market increases. Th i ha
the effect of enhancing the overall value of the firm , as the value of a pharmaceutical
company is ultimately deri ved from the value of it future drug . Through valuing an
entire firm ' s pipeline, it is po sible to attempt to value the entire firm . Thi help
offer the firm some guidance and certainty when trying to determine how much they
should be wi lling to pay to make a potential deal worthwhile for their inve tors .
Clearly, for pharmaceutical companies looking for future ources of revenu e,
in vesting in research and development in hopes of bolstering the firm ' s own pipeline
is not always a reliable strategy. The process of developing new compounds and
getting them approved can take fourteen years or longer and is extremel y expensive.
Further, failures, particularly in the later stages, can lead to gaps in the pipeline which
wi 11 d isru pt a fi rm' s revenue stream as other drugs come off patent. These factors
make growing revenues at a consistent rate and increasing hareholder value
extremel y difficult.
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Given the many problems associated with inve tments in re earch and
development, it is not surprising that pharmaceutical companies have often looked for
other way to compensate for gaps in the pipeline and to help maintain their expected
revenues. All indication are that mergers and acquisition will remain a key trategy
in the pharmaceutical sector for the foreseeable future .

Mergers and Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical rndustry

The pharmaceutical industry is an ideal industry in which to study mergers
and acqui itions. This is because it is an important international industry
compromised of many firms engaged in fierce competition, and they develop
extremely important products with the potential to save and improve countless lives.
There i also great diversity with regard to the size of these firms, as sizes range from
some extremely small firms which operate mostly locally and are privately held to
enormous international firms such as Pfizer, Inc., which has global revenues of nearly
$50B . Most importantly for the purposes of this paper, these firm con tantly face
pressure to innovate and bring new drugs to the market. One of the result of this
pre sure is that firms of all sizes in the pharmaceutical indu try have frequently
engaged in mergers and acquisitions as a way to maintain their revenue streams and
increase shareholder value.
The pharmaceutical industry is also an extremely complex ector that is
constantly faced with both short-term and long-term challenges and uncertainties.
The expiration of a key patent on a blockbuster drug and the subsequent generic
competition can devastate a firm's previously most reliable ource of revenue.
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Maintaining a pipeline of drug that will drive revenues in the future is far from
guaranteed . As discussed previou ly, new drugs are costly and time-con uming to
develop, and the vast majority of potential new drugs fail to gain the Food and Drug
Administration ' approval and thus never reach the market. From the start of the
development process it take a new drug over ten years to reach the market, and less
than one out of every hundred compounds that are studied in the preclinical stage ever
make it to human testing. Further, only one in five of the drug that do make it to
human testing succeed in gaining FDA approval (Grabowski 2002) . A failed drug
leaves the firm with nothing to show for their time and resources invested in the
project.
The industry also experiences seemingly endless political uncertainty, as " big
pharma" and their allegedly outrageous profits i always an easy target for
grandstanding politicians. These political attacks increase the uncertainty regarding
the potential for future drugs currently being researched and developed to provide
strong revenues if and when they ultimately reach the market. The current healthcare
reform debate is merely the latest in a long line of government attempts to get more
involved in the healthcare system to the detriment of pharmaceutical companies.
These debates always increase the doubt about whether the drugs currently in a firm's
pipeline will be adequate to meet analysts' and investors' expectation even if there
are no unexpected failures . This added uncertainty further pressures pharmaceutical
companies to have a strong pipeline of drugs that will reach the market and succeed .
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Acquisition Theories

There is a great deal of literature that discu sses the motivation for
acqUi ition s in the pharmaceutical industry and offers various exp lanations for why
there are so many pharmaceutical mergers and acquisitions. Some of this li terature
argues that the sy nergies that can be created from bring ing two firms together are a
driver of merger activity. For example, William Pursche, an advisor to companies in
a variety of sectors and a veteran of over three hundred merger and acquisitions,
argues that in the pharmaceutical indu stry, "for com pan ies that can capture co t
synergies thro ugh acquisitions there are considerable opportu niti es to create valu e"
(Pursche 1996). This can indeed be the case, although most of the benefits that come
with synergie are recognized in the short term . However, there can also be some
eriou inefficiencies when the two firms first come together that can have the effect
of offsetting some of the benefits from shorter term synergies.
There is some management literature that argues that manager' s egos can be a
reason for all the mergers. The argument is that top executive want to run the largest
and most powerful company possible. This desire can cloud a ma nager ' s judgment
and lead them to believe that they will be able to succeed where many mergi ng
pharmaceutical firms before them have failed . In criticizing the merger talks between
GlaxoWellcome and SmithKline Beecham that would ultimately create
GlaxoS mithKline, Fortune ran an article in which Glaxo COO Sean Lance criticized
the process, declaring that " megalomania seems to be the driving force of these
merger . Egos are taking precedence over future strategies" (Guyon 1998) . Given
this, it is not surprising that the GlaxoWellcome and SmithKline Beecham merger has

10

been roundly criticized for creating a larger but less uccessful company which has
failed to produce higher shareholder returns (Heracleou and Murray 2001) .
Other scholars believe that firms in this industry merge to diversify the drugs
which are providing the bulk of their revenue. Pfizer Chief Executive Officer Jeff
Kindler explained his company ' s $68B acqui ition of Wyeth by saying that, "this deal
is about transforming our company into a more diversified busine s, and to providing
[ ic] real focus and accountability across those businesses" (Chiang 2009) . Mergers
can be a valuable way to prevent a firm from becoming overly dependent on one
blockbuster drug, and therefore the firm will be in a position to better handle the
inevitable patent expiration and subsequent generic competition that one key drug
will eventually face . Further, Vasudevan Ramanujam and P. Varadarajan explain that
" the ri ing co t of internal development. . . has rendered acquisition-ba ed
diversification increasingly attractive to firms" (Ramanujam and Varadarajan 1989).
While all these theories seem to make some sense, the one key motivation for
merger and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry are pipeline related . In this
industry, a firm ' s pipeline is absolutely critical. The pipeline receives intense
scrutiny from analysts and rating agencies, because the quality of the pipeline is
extremely significant in knowing if the company will be able to pay back its debt
and grow their revenue in the future when their key current drugs come off patent.
Therefore, firms in this industry turn to mergers and acquisitions when there are gap
in their pipeline due to late-stage and unexpected failures . As Simon Frantz
explained, pharmaceutical mergers are "driven by losing major patents and not having
enough drugs in their pipelines to fill the gaps" (Frantz 2006) .
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Advantages and Drawbacks of Acquisitions
Acqlfiring Firm

Given all the problems and potential pitfall that go along with trying to
ustain revenues through internal research and development, it is not urprising that
pharmaceutical companies often engage in mergers and acquisitions to help maintain
trong revenue streams and profits. Bringing two companies together can provide an
immediate boost to the acquiring firm 's pipeline. This strategy is also the best way
for a firm to circumvent the long and costly proces of developing a drug from the
start of the process discussed above through acquiring the promising pipeline of
another firm . Since some of the drugs in a target firm 's pipeline should be in the later
stages of testing, there will be a much higher probability of these drugs reaching
market then if the target had to start from the beginning of the process. These drugs,
if they do indeed gain FDA approval , will obviously be able to reach the market much
sooner than if a drug was just starting the proce s, and thus can help compensate for
whatever patent expirations or late stage failures the acquiring firm has experienced .
One of the challenges for a firm looking to make an acqui ition is determining
how much a potential target is worth . As a result of the uncertainty that a drug
making its way through the development process will make it to market, it can be
difficult to value a firm ' s pipeline in order to ultimately determine how much the
acquirer should be willing to pay, even with the model created by Kellogg and
Charnes (2000) discussed above.
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7'al'ge/ Fi 1'/77
Although this all sounds good for the acquiring firm , it rai se an obviou
question : Why would the e target firms with such promising pipelines want to be
acquired by another firm troubled with patent expirations and/o r pipeline failures?
On the urface, it would seem as though a firm with strong future pro pects would be
better off remaining on it own in order to reap all the benefits when their drugs do
reach the market. However, there are several reasons why a mall firm with a
seemingly bright future would want to be acquired . First and foremo t, the acquiring
firm generally has to pay a significant price to complete the acquisition (Snellgrove
200 I). This allows the target firm and its shareholders to receive a substantial return
on their in ve tment. Depending on how the deal is structured, if the shareholders of
the target fi rm receive shares of the acquiring firm , they still have the opportunity to
benefit from the new and presumably stronger company . If they receive all ca h for
their stock in the target firm , then they got a solid return on their investment without
the risk that they will lose money if there is an unexpected failure in the pipeline.
This ri sk is always an inherent part of investing in the pharmaceutical industry .
Further, they always have the option of buying shares in the acquiring firm in the
open market if they so choose.
Target firms are also sometimes motivated to be acquired if they are having
difficulty accessing credit. This problem is exacerbated during difficult economic
time , and can lead to smaller firms actively looking for another firm that would be
interested in acquiring them (Schmidt 2008). If a target firm currently does not have
strong revenues and is not yet a well-established company, they may have problems
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getting the fund nece ary to continue investing in re earch and development even
during normal economic times, regardless of how promising their pipeline may be.
Thi i the re ult of the inherent uncertainty of attempting to bring a drug to market,
no matter how much revenue that drug might produce if and when it actually reaches
the public. For firms in this difficult situation, their best option may very well be to
be acquired by a larger, more established company that has a good deal of cash on
hand and can more easily access credit. These larger firms generally offer the
additional benefit of having a stronger system to manufacture and distribute a new
drug to the public once it is approved by the FDA than the target firm would have on
its own, as a result of their having gone through the process many times before.

Drawbacks
Despite these benefits for both the acquiring and target firms in a
pharmaceutical merger or acquisition, there are also several potential drawback to
this strategy that an acquiring firm should be wary of. The most ignificant drawback
is that the time and effort it takes to bring two different companies together can take
the focus away from research and development, which can hurt the long-term
potential of the pipeline. Mergers can also be extraordinarily expensive, which means
that significant financial resources will have to be committed in order to make the
merger happen . These are financial resources that might otherwise be devoted to
research and development that would ensure the future strength of the pipeline.
Further, bringing two distinct teams of researchers from their own di tinct cultures
can disrupt innovation, which obviously has a negative effect on the pipeline.
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The e drawbacks have doomed many mergers in the pharmaceutical indu try .
T hese fai lures have ranged from deal s between relati vely small firms to orne of the
large t and mo t hig h profile mergers that have occurred in recent year . The e
failures have led many scholars to question if mergers and acquisitions are actuall y an
effective or even an appropriate strategy for firms hoping to grow revenues and
increa e hareholder value in thi s industry. One tud y found that "despite the
attracti veness of mergers in the pharmaceutical indu try, [they found] no abnormal
returns from mergers for acquiring companies" (Hassan et al. 2007). Another tudy
goes even furt her, stating that "there is a general background of evidence to show that
mergers frequently destroy shareholder values. The pharmaceutical sector is no
exception" (Heracleous Murray 200 I) .

Biotechnology Firms and Acquisition Value
While many studies have examined mergers and acquisitions in the
pharmaceutical industry, this study will be examining the characteristics of drugs in
the target firm's pipeline. Specifically, the effect of biotechnology drugs in the
target ' pipeline will be closely scrutinized . Biotech drugs, unlike traditional
pharmaceuticals, are produced from living organisms, and thus are more expensive to
manufacture and distribute than traditional pharmaceuticals. The biotech field is
currently the fastest growing and most promising area of pharmaceutical re earch .
Biotech drugs are a relatively new area of pharmaceutical di covery, and as Henry
Grabowski (2002) explains, they may in the near future be able to reach the market
faster and achieve higher success rates. This fact, coupled with biotech ' s potential to
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effectively treat a wide range of serious conditions, ha led to heavy in vestm ent in
the deve lopme nt of biotech drugs. However, Grabow ki concedes that presently, the
costs of development are no lower and sometimes even hi gher, and the likelihood of a
drug reaching the market are no better for biotech drugs than for traditional drug
(Grabowski 2002) . This is possibl y why we do not presently see an ever greater
percentage of biotech drugs in pharmaceutical pipelines.
The production of these biotech drugs can be extremely complicated .
Although the process by which these drugs come to the market after being crutinized
by the FDA doe not differ materially from the process traditional pharmaceut icals
undergo, the actual production and manufacturing of these drugs is much different.
One schol arl y article concluded that the result of the complexity of manufacturing
biotech drugs is higher barriers to entry, which will help reduce the competition once
the drug lose patent protection (Grabowski et al. 2006) . This would make biotech
drugs in a target firm ' s pipeline extremely attractive to pharmaceutical companie
looking to make an acquisition, as their traditional drugs are constantly threatened by
generic competition.
The biotech field is an area that holds immense promise and is getting
significant attention . Due to the incredible potential biotechnology drugs ha ve to
treat a host of ailment from Alzheimer 's to diabetes, there is a belief that these drugs
will be major revenue drivers in the future . As it was reported in RusinessJlfieek in
2005 , it seems that "Biotechnology has finally come of age." Pharmaceutical firms
are making heavy bets that this will indeed be the case, and that biotechnology is the
future of the industry. This is reflected in the fact that "Biotech increasingly
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dominate the pipeline (44% of all discovery stage candidates) and has a g ro w ing
share of drug applications (about one in ten offilin g )" (Lawrence 200 5). Indeed,
numerous mall firms, and even some very large firms uch as Amgen (the large t
pla yer with revenues in excess of$14 .7B), have been started that focus solel y on the
developm e nt of biotech drugs (Mulligan 2001) . These firms, w ith promi ing bi otech
drug s in their pipelines, are increasingly becoming attractive targets for
pharmaceutical companies looking to merge, and pharmaceutical companies are
increasingl y willing to pay a high price for these biotech companies. Indeed,
pharmaceutical companies " paying a large premium is fast becoming the indu stry
tandard and again reflecting the high demand for biotech companies" (Malik 2009).

Hypotheses and Relevance for Investors
If biotech firms do command a premium, investors will want to anticipate the
merger prior to the announcement when abnormal returns appear to occur. A positive
market reaction would result in investors in the acquiring firm achieving superior
returns around the time of the announcement. Previous research has not examined the
pipeline composition, and it is expected that a close analysis of the target pipeline
could also help predict the likelihood that the acquisition will be well received by
market.
Hig her numbers of drugs in the later stages of development in a target firm ' s
pipeline would also be expected to increase the returns of the acquiring firm ' s
investors because these drugs are close to reaching the market and generating revenue
for the acquirer. It is true that there is still no guarantee of a drug in later stage
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reaching the market and ultimatel y being uccessful. However, there i much les
uncertainty regarding potential to reach the public for a drug that has alread y been
tested on humans and achieved some good results than there would be w ith a drug
still in the pre-clinical stage. Those drugs that are in the early stage of the process
are longer duration projects, and as Bradford Cornell explains, " longer duration
projects are ' riskier,' by the sheer fact of their longer duration and , therefore, should
be discounted at hig her rate " (Cornell 1999). This fact makes those drug in the later
stages much more valuable than those in the beginning stages of gaining FDA
approval.
Potentially even more significant than late stage drugs in the target firm ' s
pipeline for predicting the likelihood of success in a pharmaceutical merger is a
biotechnology focus in a target, resulting in biotech drugs in the target firm ' s pipeline .
As discussed above, there is incredible potential for major profits would come with
the development of a new biotechnology drug. Given this, it would be expected that
a biotech focus in a target firm would lead the market to respond positively to a
biotech acquisition announcement and thus increase the return realized by the
acquiring firm ' s investors.
Finally, some financial data will also be included to see if this information can
help predict the market ' s reaction to an acquisition . The target's research and
development expenditures for the year prior to the acquisition will be recorded and
compared to the firm ' s total assets. Dividing the research and development costs by
the total assets will reveal how focused on organic pipeline development the target
firm was. Firms value research and development expenditures because it show a
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commitment to the development of successful new drugs and lays the foundation for
future revenues . It is bel ieved that targets that put proportionately more of their
resource into development will be more favorably received by the market.

Emp irical Methodology and Analysis

In orderto test if a biotechnology focus, late stage drugs in the target firm ' s
pipeline and strong investments in research and development will indeed lead to
higher returns for the acquiring firm ' s investors, a two step empirical methodology
will be used . The first step is known as an event study, a study where the market's
response in the trading days surrounding a major event is studied . The econd step is
analyzing the residuals from the event study to see if it can be determined what is
driving the residuals . The following sections will discuss in detail the various tests .
run and will analyze the results .

,)'Iep

One: Hvent Study
Testing the hypotheses put forth in this paper required performing an event

study, which is any study that measures the impact of a specific event on the
valuation of a company. There are numerous possibilities for events to be tudied .
The po sibilities include earnings announcements, the sale of new stock or changes in
management. In this study, the event will be the official announcement of the
acquisition . Event studies are helpful, because "given rationality in the marketplace,
the effect of an event will be reflected immediately in asset price. Thus the event ' s
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economic impact can be measured using asset prices observed over a relatively sho l1
period of time" (Campbell , Lo and MacKinlay 199 7) .
The actual event in this study will be the day the acqui ition was officially
announced .

n event window to be examined must also be defin ed, si nce rumor of

the acquisition could potentially cause abnormal price return s in the trading days
leading up to the announcement, and there could be post-announceme nt drift that
re ults in abno rmal returns in the days immediately following the announcement.
This window should be adequate to capture all the price action that would be a result
of the acquisition. In this study the event window will start at the eighteenth trading
da y prior to the acquisition announcement and end at the close of the twentieth
trading day after the announcement.
Pri or to the event window the movement of an acquirer ' stock price i
assumed to follow the general trend of the industry. A 100 day estimation period was
used to capture the relationship between the target firm and the industry. Thi is a
variant of the market model :

E[EU] = 0
Var[E it ]

Rit

= O"Ji

is the return of acquirer i at time period t, and

for the same period .

Eit

R mt

is the industry return

represents the zero mean disturbance term, and

U i ' ~i '

and

CY~i are the model's parameters. This model shows the expected linear relationship

20

between the individual acquirer' s performance and the broader performance of the
pharmaceutical industry (Campbell , Lo and MacKinlay 1997).
Given this " normal " relationship, the model is used to estimate the expected
return during the thirty-eight day event period The excess (or " abnormal " ) return of
the acquirer' s stock during event period T is measured

WhereEtT, RiT and E(RiT) are the abnormal , actual and normal (expected) returns,
respectively for the event time period T. XT is the conditioning information for the
normal performance model. Excess residuals for each firm are average for each day
duri ng the event period:

"n
L.. i=O E*iT X (1)
- -n

E-T

Average residuals are summed over time and denoted as the cumulative average
residuals (CARs) .

Step 'li-vo: Residual Analysis
Once the CARs are gathered, regression analysis can be utilized to as ess the
impact of pipeline composition and maturity on CARs. It is expected that the CARs
are a function of characteristics of the target firm . The model that will be used is
presented below.

R&D

Total Assetsi
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Ili

For this study it will be important to control for the type of target and the
pipeline composition . Also included in the model is the target ' s in ve tment in
research and development.

Data

Gathering the Data
To test the hypotheses, a list of potential acquisitions was generated with the
help of the Mergent Database, which identifies firms which are no longer actively
traded. Because of the need for transparency in creating the data set, all targets were
publicly traded at the time of the announcement, as was the acquiring firm . All of the
acquisition had occurred fairly recently, as no acquisition on the list had been
announced fart her back than 1999 . I

The target in each acquisition was cl assified as

either a traditi onal pharmaceutical firm or as a biotechnology firm based on the
company' s SIC code? This process produced 23 traditional pharmaceutical targets,
representing 56% of the sample and 18 biotech targets, representing 44% of the
sampl e .
Once the list of targets was created and each firm was classified as either a
traditional pharmaceutical or a biotech, the pipelines of the targets had to be analyzed .
To accomplish this, the Mergent Database was again used , this time to obtain each
target' s annual report for the full year prior to the year the merger was announced .

1 The ori ginal sa mple contained 45 firms . Three traditional targets and one biotech target were
excluded from the data set because they showed no statistical significance with the industry index the
underlyi ng return following the annOlll1cemenl. Firms used in the study are Ii ted in Appendix .
2 Those targets with an SlC code of2834 were classified as traditional pharmaceuticals and tho e with
an SIC code of 2836 were classified as biotechs (Golec and Vernon 2009).
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T he e annual report provided pipeline information, and the number of approved
drugs a well as the number of drug in de velopment wa recorded as well a the
tage of de velopment for each drug in the pipeline.
Some relevant financial data for each firm was also recorded .

pecificall y,

the target' research and de velopm e nt expenditures for the year prior to the
announcement were recorded to see iffirm s who had made a heavy commitment to
re earch received any premium . To put the research costs in the proper perspecti ve,
the target's total assets were also recorded . This allowed a variable to be created that
wou ld take into consideration the different sizes of the targets when determi ning how
signifi cant the investments in research were. For a co mplete breakdown of the
variabl es co ll ected from the annual reports, see Table-\ bel ow.

Table-l
oescnptlOn 0 f V ana
. bl es
Variable
Prec

Description
Number of drugs in the target's pipeline in
the preclinical stage of development
Number of drugs in the target's pipeline in

pi

phase' of clinical development

p2

Number of drugs in the target's pipeline in
phase II of clinical development
Number of drugs in the target's pipeline in

p3
App

phase "' of clinical development
Number of the target's drugs that have
received FDA approval

Biot

Dummy variable where 0 is a traditional
pharmaceutical and 1 is a biotech .

Rd

Target's expenditures on research &
development for the year prior to the
acquisition announcement

Ta

Target' s total assets reported for the year
prior to the acquisition announcement

Rdta

Target's research & development divided by
the total assets
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Stock price information for the acquirer as well as for a pharmaceutical index
wa collected . The index chosen is the AMEX Pharmaceutical Index, which trades
under the ticker symbol DRG . Thi index is designed to mirror the equity
performance of the pharmaceutical sector. In collecting stock price data, for both
each acquiring firm and the index close prices were recorded for each of the eighteen
trading days prior to the announcement of the acquisition, the close price on the day
the acqui ition was announced and the close price for each of the twenty days after
the announcement. The logarithms for the recorded closing prices for both the
acquiring firms and the index were then calculated, as these are proxies for asset
returns.

Descriptive Statistics

The mean for drugs in the pipeline in the preclinical stage of development was
slightly over three, while the average number of approved drugs was under two . It i
also interesting to note the wide range in research and development expenditures and
total assets observed in the sample. The ratio of research and development to total
assets also speaks to the wide variation in the size of the targets. The target with the
highest ratio spent a staggering 32 times more on research and development than the
firm had in total assets. This reflects the fact that the sample captured firms of greatly
different sizes. For further details about the data, see the descriptive table for the
variables in Table-2, below.
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Table-2
D escnp
. fIve St a f IS fICS

Variable
prec
pI
p2
p3
app
biot
Rd (millions)
ta (millions)
rdta

Mean
3.22
2 .07
2.20
2 .02
1.90
0.439
120.42
692 .55
1.134

Minimum
0
0
0
0
0
0
7.57
4,500
0.098

Maximum
13
9
17
19
34
1
1,259
11 ,442
32 .289

Empirical Results

Calculating ('AR
To determine how the market is responding to acquisitions in the
pharmaceutical industry, the returns in each acquisition had to be compared to the
returns observed in the broad pharmaceutical index . This process had several tep .
First, the industry index performance was used to predict the performance of each
individual acquirer's stock . The deviation in the acquirer 's actual performance,
called the residual, was then calculated for each day observed . The ob ervations for
the acquirers of traditional pharmaceutical targets were then epa rated from the
information on the acquirers of biotech firms . For both of these groups the residuals
could then be accumulated so that the net abnormal returns could be analyzed . This
was accomplished by simply summing the individual residuals for every day
proceeding the day being analyzed . These net abnormal returns are known as the
cumulative average residuals .
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Once the cumulative average residual were calculated, the average
cumulative average residuals for each day could be calculated for both the traditional
and biotech targets . This was accomplished by averaging the cumulative average
residual for each acquiring firm across each day. It is expected that the CARs will
be near zero for the days leading up to the event, that is that investor will on average
over time will not receive a return other than what is the normal market return .
However, the e residuals could differ after the announcement depending on the
reactions of the market to the information in the announcement.

Any ignificant

CARs in the time leading up to the announcement could indicate that investors are
trading on rumors of the announcement. It is also expected that the CAR will be
higher for firms acquiring biotechs that for those acquiring traditional pharmaceutical
firm , ince there may be cash flow advantages in the biotech generic market. The .
comparison will allow us to evaluate how the market is responding to biotech target
as compared to their traditional counterparts. The results are pre ented in Graph-I
below.

3

3

The table of daily average residuals and CARs are presented in Appendix I.
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Graph-l

CARs
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Interestingly, the graph shows that the CARs begin to trend higher for the
firms acquiring traditional targets right away. This suggests that buyin g on rumors is
occurring. There is less of a move before the announcement for the biotech acquirers,
perhaps because with some of the smaller biotech firm there i les media scrutiny
and fewer rumors are leaked . The strong performance of the traditional acquirers
refutes the notion that the market has become generally negative on pharmaceutical
acquisition s and will thus knock the stock of the acquiring firm down . However, in
the days following the announcement, the performance of acqu irers of traditional
pharmaceutical firms begins to level off, whereas the biotech acquirers really begin to
see positive abnormal returns. By the twentieth day following the announcement, the
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abnormal return for each type of acquirer is similar, sugge ting that the acquirers of
biotech firm s are not seeing higher returns than the acquirer of traditional targets.
The next step in the process wa to determine if the re uIts were statisticall y
significant. To determine significance, the available data was used to calculate the
tandard error. From this the JI statistic, used to determine statistical sig nificance,
was calculated by dividing the average cumulative average residual by the standard
error. The results for the acquirers of traditional firms reveal that the results are
statisticall y significant at the 99% confidence interval for the entire event window.
For the biotech acquirers, the results are statistically significant at the 99% confidence
interval for the first five days of the event window, then lose their statistical
significance until the third day before the announcement. The results then remain
significant at the 99% confidence interval for the duration of the event window.

Pipeline Impact on ('ARs
Four regression models were run in order to see if it could be determined what
factors the market values in a target firm when pricing the acquirer. The first of these
regressions was for the eighteenth trading day prior to the announcement of the
acquisition . The second was the day of the announcement and the third was for the
twentieth day after the announcement. The fourth model took the firms ' average
CARs for the five days immediately after the acquisition was announced . The results
are in Table-3 below.

28

Table-3
Impact of Firm's Pipeline on CARs for Particular Days during Event Window
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Variable

0.00185
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-18*
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0.01541

0.34

20*
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*t-statistics
The first column for each day how the variable ' s coefficient while the
second column shows its t-value. The results reveal that for the eighteenth trading '
day before the announcement of the acquisition the model can explain less than 40%
of the observed variation . However, the day of the announcement the model 's ability
to explain the variation jumps to slightly over 56%. The average of the five days
after the announcement is the strongest model , predicting ju t over 57% of the
variation. By the twentieth day after the announcement, the model ' s ability to explain
the observed CARs is back below 50% .
In looking at the individual variables, the market seems to value the Phase lIT

drugs, while not valuing projects in the earlier stage of development. The value of
the coefficient on the Phase HI drugs also continuously rises as it gets later in the
event window. This is not surprising, given that Phase HI drugs are close to reaching
the market and thus face less uncertainty than the drugs in the earlier stage of
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development. 1t is interesting that the market seems to even value Pha e III drug
more than drugs already approved , perhaps becau e the patent on those drugs has
already began to run out, while Phase III drugs will enjoy a longer period of
protection . Although drugs in the earlier stages of development are not statistically
ignificant, it is interesting to note that the coefficients do grow for each stage of
development a the drug gets closer to the market. The coefficients for drug in the
preclinical stage are particularly small , not surprising given the tremendous rate of
failure at that stage.
The ratio comparing the target's research and development expenditure to
total as ets does not have much of an impact on how the market values the acquirer.
This does make sense, because the market will value the successes of the research
ba ed on the projects, particularly the later stage projects, in the pipeline. The market
is not rewarding a commitment to high expenditures on research .
Con istent with the results found in Graph-I , the model shows that the market
is not giving a premium for biotech acquisitions. This could possibly be a result of
the high price acquirers of biotech firms have to pay since, as discussed above,
biotech firms often sell for a premium . This could weigh down the acquirer's
performance in the wake of the acquisition announcement.

Conclusion
There is a great deal of room for additional research on this subject. Future
studies may want to examine whether the market values acquisitions between two
firms who have collaborated on the development of a drug in the past. The market
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may value thi pa t collaboration since the firm ' s are already familiar with ea c h other
and have worked successfully in the past, creating a familiarity that may ea e the
transition that i sometimes difficult.
Future research may also want to consider using a longer time horizon when
analyzing an acquirer' performance. The relatively short time horizon utilized in
thi study was appropriate for an event study, but it would be interesting to ee if the
pipeline information would have an effect over the longer term performance of the
acquirer. Testing this could be made more difficult by firms that frequently make
acquisition . One other possible avenue for future research could be to analyze the
therapeutic class of the drugs in development. Thi would reveal whether the market
values firms that focus on developing drugs that treat conditions that tend to be very
profitable.
In a fiercely competitive industry such as the pharmaceutical industry,
acquisition will likely remain a key strategy for firm looking to maintain their
revenues for the foreseeable future . Given this, it would benefit investors to have
more information about what characteristics the market values in a target firm so that
they can invest their capital wisely. Hopefully future research will be able to hed
additional light on this question .
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Appendix-l
Traditional
Event
Day

Biotech

CAR

J1

-0.0142020

-0.0142021

N/A

-0.015130677

-0.02933 27

Individual Day

CAR

J1

-0.01420 2069

0 .0067042

N/A

-38.4162

-0 .015130677

0 .01140 27

5.163583

-0 .0472242

-41 .2695

-0 .017891411

0.0107209

3.686395

-0 .0643162

-53.1054

-0 .017092019

0 .0106867

3.325546

-0.0805445
-0.0969593

-56.9067

-0.016414787

0.012289
0 .0148435

3.460265
3.74658

-12

-0.017514267

-0.1144736

-66.3438
-71 .0741

-0 .016 228336
-0 .016414787
-0.0175142 67

0.00966 23

1.925208

-11

-0.013035384

-0.1275089

-65 .9513

-0 .0130353 84

0 .0022185

0.438084

-10

-0.1380903

-66.1675

-0.0105813 26

-0 .0023 179

-0.4566

-9

-0.010581326
-0.010967438

-0.1490577

-70.3769

-0.010967438

-0.0047723

-0.84423

-8

-0.01334873

-76.3568

-0.013 34873

-7

-0.014089228

-0.1624064
-0 .1764957

-82.2683

-0.014089228

-0.0063067
-0.0037703

-1. 04058
-0.55904

-6

-0.011811327

-84.9

-5

-0 .011770587
-0.013558449

-0.188307
-0.2000776
-0.213636

-0.0019065
-0.0038999
-0.0145586

-0.27448
-0.56965
-2.13 856

-0.010114095

-0 .2237501

-85 .3342
-85 .2569

-0 .011811327
-0.011770587
-0.013558449
-0 .010114095

-0 .0 278063

-4.09905

-2

-0.011974309

-0 .2357244

-84.3494

-0.011974309

-6.1970 2

-1

-0.014151906

-0 .2498763

-84.5134

-0.014151906

-0.0420362
-0.05 31999

0

-0.007710816

-0.2575872

-0 .007710816

-0 .0567263

-8. 3 2509

1

-0.007834152

-0.2654213

-85 .8166
-86.743

-0.007834152

-0 .06 22641

-9.09948

2

-0.007292702

-0 .272714

-88.1353

-0.007292702

-0.064464 1

-9.38433

3

-0.006727243

-0 .2794413

-89.3915

-0 .006727243

-0 .0637611

-9.37 264

4
5

-0.00811032

-0 .2875516
-0.2958538

-91 .0823

-0 .00811032

-0 .0578101

-8.58538

-93 .2065

-0.008302205

-0 .0584 233

-8 .79 201

-0.3027368
-0.3067751

-95 .1462
-94.0251

-0.006883048

-0.061737

-9.38253

-0.0816071

-11.1241

-0 .0994207

-12.8783

-18
-17
-16

-0. 017891411

-15

-0.017092019

-14

-0.016228336

-13

-4
-3

6
7

-0.008302205
-0.006883048

-85 .5006

Ind ividu al Day

-7. 86 15 2

8

-0.004038273
-0.005150245

-0.3119253

-93 .6879

-0.004038273
-0.005150245

9

-0.006628577

-0.3185539

-95.5436

-0.006628577

-0.1157829

-14 .273

10

-0.003945307

-0.3224992

-95 .5941

-0.003945307

-0.130636

-15. 767

11
12

-0.003612651
-0.003717322

-0.3261119
-0.3298292

-95.4538
-95.8569

-0 .1486653
-0 .16383 15

-17. 7732
-19.7051

13

-0.005093876

-0.3349231

-97.5159

-0.003612651
-0.003717322
-0.005093876

-0.1825062

-21.9234

14

-0.002540888

-0.337464

-97.3696

-0 .002540888

-0.001329242

-0.3387932

-96.8241

-0.001329242

-0 .209045
-0.2347301

-24.5943

15
16

-0.001334373

-0.3401276

-96.6595

-0 .001334373

-0.2584567

-29 .3946

17

-0.000457038

-0.3405846

-95 .7409

-0.0004570 38

-0 .2777212

-3 1.4305

18

-0.000204411

-0.340789

-94.2191

-0 .000204411

-0.2956295

-33 .355

19
20

-0.002218695
-0.000261427

-0 .3430077
-0 .3432692

-94.3336
-93.8397

-0.002218695
-0 .000261427

-0.3159929
-0.3378583

-35.4582
-3 7.7524
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-27.0416

Mergers in the Sample
Label

Acquirer

Target

ml

Abbott Labs

Kos Pharma

m2

Alza

Crescendo

m3

Bristol Myers-Squibb

Medarex

m6

Chiron

Matrix Pharmaceutical

m7

Eli Li lIy

lcos

m8

Eli Lilly

SGX

m9

Eli Lilly

Applied Molecular

ml0

Genzyme

GelTex Pharma

mll
m12

Genzyme
Gilead

AnorMed
Myogen

m13

Indevus

Valera

m14

Johnson & Johnson

Cougar

m15

Johnson & Johnson

3-Dimensional Pharma

m16
m17

Merck
Merck

Sibia
Sirna

m18

Millennium

COR Therapeutics

m20

Pfizer

Warner-Lambert Co .

m21

Pfizer

Encysive

m22

Pfizer

Vicuron

m23

Pfizer

Coley

m24

Pfizer

Esperion

m25

Shire

New River Pharma

m26

Warner-Lam bert

Agouron Pharma

m27

Amgen

Abgenix

m28

Amgen

Immunex

m29
m30

AstraZeneca
AstraZeneca

Medlmmune
Cambridge Antibody Tech.

m31

Bristol Myers-Squibb

Kosan Biosciences

m32

Bristol Myers-Squibb

Medarex

m33

Corixa

Ribi ImmunoChem

m34

Elan

m35
m37

Eli Lilly
Genzyme

Liposome
ImCione

m38

Genzyme

Sangstat
Osiris

m39
m40

GlaxoSmithKline
GlaxoSmithKline

Corixa
ID Biomed

m41

Johnson & Johnson

Omrix

m42
m43

Medlmmune
Merck

Aviron
Serono

m44

Pharmacia

Sugen

m45

Shire

Transkaryotic Therapies
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